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How should we regulate systemic risk? Many regulatory responses, 
like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically 
motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or 
not they exist).2 To be most effective, however, the regulation must be 
situated within a more analytical framework.   
 
 I. SCOPE AND GOALS OF REGULATION  
  
 First, we need to consider the scope of systemic risk regulation. There 
has been a great deal of regulatory focus on banks and other financial 
institutions (hereinafter, “financial firms”). Some of this is path dependent: 
historically, a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of 
systemic risk. The media and politicians also have focused on financial firms 
because they are so visible and their problems have been so dramatic. 
 
 But we also need to recognize that the ongoing trend towards 
disintermediation—enabling companies to directly access the ultimate 
source of funds, the capital markets, without going through financial 
intermediaries—is making financial markets themselves increasingly central 
to any examination of systemic risk.3   
 
For example, although the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 
filled the headlines, its trigger was the collapse of the market for mortgage-
                                                 
2 The Dodd-Frank Act delegates much of the regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases 
after the relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act 
creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential 
systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. Dodd-Frank Act § 112. The Council will be aided in this 
task by a newly-created and, hopefully, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. Id.  Regulators therefore 
will have the ability to look beyond the Act’s confines. 
3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 200 (2008). 
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backed securities. Many of these securities were collateralized in part by 
risky subprime home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced 
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the 
borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. These defaults 
caused substantial amounts of investment-grade rated mortgage-backed 
securities to be downgraded and, in some cases, to default. Investors began 
losing confidence in these and other rated securities, and their market prices 
started falling.  
 
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed 
securities, was particularly exposed. Lehman’s counterparties began 
demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not provide. Absent 
a government bailout, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. That, in turn, caused 
securities markets to panic; even the short-term commercial paper market 
virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities 
collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage loans 
backing those securities.4 That accelerated the death spiral, causing financial 
firms holding mortgage-backed securities to appear, if not be, more 
financially risky; requiring highly leveraged firms to engage in fire-sales of 
assets (thereby exacerbating the fall in prices); and shutting off credit 
markets, which impacted the real economy. 
 
This illustrates that both financial firms and financial markets can, if 
they fail, be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. The scope of any 
                                                 
4 Even prior to Lehman’s collapse, MBS may have been undervalued in the market. For example, in July 
2008 I was an expert in the Orion Finance SIV case in the English High Court of Justice. Orion’s 
mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents on the dollar, whereas the present value 
of its reasonably-expected cash flows was around 88 cents on the dollar because most of the mortgages 
were prime. 
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regulatory framework for managing systemic risk should therefore include 
both financial firms and markets. 
 
Before attempting to design such a regulatory framework, we need to 
examine what the framework’s goals should be. The primary goal for 
regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic 
efficiency. Systemic risk is a form of financial risk, so efficiency should 
certainly be a goal in its regulation. But systemic risk also represents risk to 
the financial system itself. Any framework for regulating systemic risk 
therefore should include this macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial 
system itself.5 
 
II. MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE 
 FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
 
Financial regulation can help to maximize economic efficiency by 
correcting market failures. I believe that at least four types of partly 
interrelated market failures occur within the financial system: information 
failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure.  
 
A. Correcting Information Failure 
Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure.6 
Financial markets and products are already incredibly complex, and that 
                                                 
5 For a critical discussion of the rationale of financial regulation, see EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE 
OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS (2012). 
6 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 211 (2009/2010). Information failure can arise from other causes as well, 
including the potential for transaction costs relating to information acquisition to diminish the value of new 
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complexity is certain to increase. Profit opportunities are inherent in 
complexity, due in part to investor demand for securities that more precisely 
match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases 
complexity as market participants take advantage of inconsistent regulatory 
regimes both within and across national borders. And new technologies 
continue to add complexity not only to financial products but also to 
financial markets.7 
 
Complexity has been undermining disclosure, which has been the 
chief regulatory response to financial information failure.8 Although most, if 
not all, of the risks on complex mortgage-backed securities were disclosed 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, many institutional investors—including 
even the largest, most sophisticated, firms—bought these securities without 
fully understanding them.9 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving 
disclosure.10 I fear its efficacy will be limited, however. Commentators have 
questioned whether some financial structures are getting so complex that 
they are incomprehensible.11 Furthermore, it may well be rational for an 
                                                                                                                                                 
information (and thus the incentive to acquire such information). Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (June 1980). 
7 I have argued that there are two aspects to complexity: cognitive complexity, meaning that things are too 
complicated and non-linear to understand; and temporal complexity, meaning that systems work too 
quickly and interactively to control. Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 214-15. 
Engineers sometimes refer to temporal complexity as tight coupling. Id.  
8 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1197 (1999) (discussing the general purpose of disclosure in 
the Exchange Act and the Securities Act). 
9 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH LAW REVIEW 
1109, 1110 (2008). 
10 E.g. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 
Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (requiring additional disclosure). 
11 See, e.g., David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at 
C1 (discussing that “one industry giant, the El Paso Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals 
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investor to invest in high-yielding complex securities without fully 
understanding them. Among other reasons,12 the investor simply may not 
have the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure in invest could 
competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis others who invest.  
 
This begs the question whether institutional investors will hire experts 
as needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests they do not 
always do so, and theory explains why. Although experts may be hired to the 
extent that their costs do not exceed the benefits gained from more fully 
understanding the complexity, at some level of complexity those costs will 
exceed, or at least appear to exceed any potential gain. This is because the 
cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the benefit gained from fully 
understanding complex transactions is intangible and harder to quantify—
especially since constantly innovating markets cause rapid informational 
obsolescence. Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may well give 
greater weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible 
benefit. The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the 
more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of equilibrium.13  
 
Information failure not only undermines investor disclosure. It also 
undermines the ability of regulators themselves to keep up with the financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
[using off-balance sheet partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible”). It 
appears hyperbolic to say that structures created by humans cannot be understood by humans. The larger 
problem may be that relatively few people can understand the structures and that many structures may not 
be able to be understood by any single person. 
12 For a comprehensive review of these reasons, see Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
supra note 9, at 1113-15.    
13 The analysis above is taken from Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, id. 
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industry, and indeed regulators have extreme difficulty keeping up with 
financial innovation.14   
 
A possible way to address information failure resulting from 
complexity would be to require investments and other financial products to 
become more standardized. One of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act, for 
example, is to standardize more derivatives transactions. To this end, the Act 
requires many derivatives to be cleared through clearinghouses,15 which 
generally require a high degree of standardization in the derivatives they 
clear.16  
 
But standardization can backfire. Dodd-Frank’s clearinghouse 
requirement might inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the 
clearinghouses themselves. And the overall economic impact of 
standardization is unclear because standardization can stifle innovation and 
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when 
firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs and risk 
preferences of investors. 
 
Dodd-Frank also attempts to address information failure by requiring 
sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum unhedged position in 
each class of securities they sell—the so-called “skin in the  game.”17 This 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Dan Awrey, “Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets” 37-51 
(Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 49/2011, Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1916649 (discussing the relationship between complexity and financial 
innovation in the regulation of OTC derivatives). 
15 Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2.  
16 This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an exception for derivatives that 
a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2(h)(3).  
17 See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941, § 15G (directing the SEC to require sponsors of asset-backed securities to 
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too can backfire. By retaining residual risk portions of certain complex 
securitization products they were selling, underwriters may actually have 
fostered false investor confidence, contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Complexity, in other words, not only can cause information asymmetry but 
also mutual misinformation.18  
 
In our world of complexity, disclosure will not always be sufficient to 
correct information failure. Moreover, even perfect disclosure would be 
insufficient to mitigate information failures that cause systemic risk. 
Individual market participants who fully understand the risk will be 
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the financial system as a 
whole. A market participant may well decide to engage in a profitable 
transaction even though doing so could increase systemic risk, since much of 
the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other 
market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an 
economic collapse.19 
 
There are, therefore, no complete solutions to the problem of financial 
information failure.  
 
B. Correcting Rationality Failure  
Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality—a type 
of information failure, but one distinct and important enough to merit a 
                                                                                                                                                 
retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the underlying assets). 
18 See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 241-42 (discussing mutual 
misinformation). 
19 See Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 3 (explaining this concept and describing it as a type of 
“tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons insofar as market participants suffer from the 
actions of other market participants; it is a more standard externality insofar as non-market participants 
suffer from the actions of market participants. 
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separate category. Investors are complacent, following the herd in their 
investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, such as rating-agency 
ratings.20 And market participants are also prone to panic.21  
 
Dodd-Frank attempts to fix a sliver of this problem by attempting to 
improve rating-agency ratings.22 However, the actions of S&P and Moody’s 
during the 2008 financial crisis arguably met the Act’s requirements, even 
had those requirements applied during the financial crisis.23  
 
The regulatory hurdle is that human nature cannot be easily changed. 
It is unclear—and Dodd-Frank does not address—how complacency can be 
remedied. And although panics are often the triggers that commence a chain 
of systemic failures, it is impossible to identify all the causes of panics that 
can trigger systemic risk.  
 
C. Correcting Principal-Agent Failure 
Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from conflicts of 
interest between managers and owners of firms. The Dodd-Frank Act 
attempts to fix this traditional type of conflict. It ignores, however, a much 
more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of secondary-
management conflicts.24 The nub of the problem is that secondary managers 
                                                 
20 Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 373, 379-83 & 404-05 (2008). 
21 For a thoughtful analysis of how rationality failures help to explain the 2008 financial crisis, see Geoffrey 
P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations 
Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010). 
22 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 931-939H. 
23 [Explain why-cite] 
24 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management 
Agency Costs, 26 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 457 (2009). 
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are almost always paid under short-term compensation schemes, misaligning 
their interests with the long-term interests of the firm.  
 
Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information 
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and the 
senior managers to whom they report. For example, as the VaR, or value-at-
risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more accepted, 
financial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for 
generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured 
by VaR.25 Secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR 
risk profile, like credit-defaults swaps that generate small gains but only 
rarely have losses. They knew, but did not always explain to their superiors, 
that any losses that might eventually occur would be huge.  
 
In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying 
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation 
schemes—e.g., deferred compensation based on long-term results. In 
practice, however, that solution must overcome a collective action problem: 
firms that offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation may not 
be able to hire as competitively as firms that offer more immediate 
compensation. Regulation will be needed to solve this collective action 
problem not only within nations but also across nations, because good 
secondary managers can work in financial centers worldwide.    
 
D. Correcting Incentive Failure 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 568 
(3d ed. 2006). 
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Risk dispersion can create benefits, such as investment diversification 
and more efficient allocation of risk. But risk can be marginalized, becoming 
so widely dispersed that rational market participants individually lack the 
incentive to monitor it.26 This problem is not unlike the tragedy of the 
anticommons in property law; where too many owners have rights to 
exclude others from a scarce resource, no individual owner has an effective 
privilege of use and the resource becomes prone to underuse.27 In a financial 
market context, by analogy, where too many owners (e.g., investors) have 
rights in a scarce resource (a class of securities), no single investor will have 
a sufficient amount at risk to individually motivate monitoring. 
Undermonitoring caused by this incentive failure appears to have 
contributed, at least in part, to the 2008 financial crisis.28  
 
 The problem of incentive failure is difficult to solve. Although 
regulation could require—perhaps for certain large issuances of complex 
securities—that a minimum unhedged position be held by a single 
sophisticated investor in each class of securities,29 regulatory attempts to 
limit risk dispersion would have tradeoffs: increasing the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage, impairing the ability of parties to achieve negotiated 
market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing financial instability.30  
 
 E. Summary 
                                                 
26 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW issue no. 3 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721606. 
27 See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 621 (1998). 
28 Cf. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Speech before the Fifth ECB Central 
Banking Conference (Nov. 13, 2008) (arguing that ‘the root cause of the [financial] crisis was the overall 
and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial institutions and countries’); Joe Nocera, Risk 
Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine).  
29 For a discussion of this type of regulation, see Marginalizing Risk, supra note 26.     
30 Id. 
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 I’ve so far examined the first goal of any regulatory framework for 
managing systemic risk: maximizing economic efficiency within the 
financial system. There are at least four types of market failures that impair 
efficiency. Information failure is primarily caused by complexity, for which 
there are no perfect solutions. Rationality failure is difficult, if not virtually 
impossible, to correct because human nature cannot be easily changed. 
Principal-agent failure can theoretically be addressed by paying managers—
including secondary managers—under longer-term compensation schemes; 
but in practice that solution must overcome collective action problems, both 
within and across national borders. And the problem of incentive failure has 
only second-best solutions. Regulation therefore cannot completely prevent 
market failures within the financial system.31  
 
 Let’s next discuss the second goal of any regulatory framework for 
managing systemic risk—protecting the financial system itself. Although 
uncorrected market failures can lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of 
capital within the financial system, they also can contribute to systemic 
failures. 
 
III. PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ITSELF 
 
There are at least three ways that regulation could protect the financial 
system itself. First, regulation could attempt to limit the triggers of systemic 
                                                 
31 In other contexts, I have summarized these markets failures more intuitively as the “3Cs” of complexity, 
conflicts, and complacency—complexity corresponding to information failure and incentive failure; 
conflicts corresponding to principal-agent failure; and complacency corresponding to rationality failure. 
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW 
REVIEW 549 (2009) (first suggesting the 3Cs categorization). Combined with the tragedy of the commons 
(see infra note 47), these failures collectively can be referred to as the 3Cs and the TOC.  
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risk. Second, regulation could attempt to limit the transmission of systemic 
shocks. Third, regulation could attempt to stabilize the financial system 
when afflicted by systemic shocks.   
 
A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Risk 
Ideal regulation would act ex ante, eliminating the triggers of systemic 
risk.32 Realistically, however, we cannot eliminate those triggers. I have 
mentioned that although panics are often the triggers that commence a chain 
of systemic failures, it is impossible even to identify all the causes of panics.  
 
To some extent also, the market failures discussed33 could trigger 
panics or other systemic shocks. For example, information failure, principal-
agent failure, and incentive failure could, individually or in combination, 
cause one or more large firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy; and 
rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a large financial market 
to collapse. As I’ve shown, these market failures cannot be completely 
corrected. 
 
It is inevitable, therefore, that our financial system will face systemic 
shocks from time to time. Consider next how to limit the transmission of 
these shocks. 
 
B. Limiting the Transmission of Systemic Shocks 
                                                 
32 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation, 
15 CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 257, 258 (2011) (observing that “[o]nce a failure occurs, there may already be 
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic”). 
33 See supra Part II. 
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Second-best regulation could act ex post, after a systemic shock is 
triggered, by limiting the transmission of the shock—i.e., limiting its 
contagion. This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which holds 
that in complex engineering systems—and, I have argued, also in complex 
financial systems—failures are almost inevitable.34 Therefore remedies 
should focus on breaking the transmission of these failures.35 
 
To break the transmission of systemic failures would require that the 
transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It probably is not feasible, 
though, to identify all those mechanisms in advance. Nonetheless, based on 
a study of four financial crises in the past century, Professor Iman Anabtawi 
of UCLA and I have attempted to describe at least one such transmission 
mechanism.36  
 
We argue that two otherwise independent correlations can combine to 
transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic crises. The first is 
an intra-firm correlation between a firm’s financial integrity and its exposure 
to risk from low-probability adverse events that either constitute or could 
lead to economic shocks. The second is a system-wide correlation among 
financial firms and markets.  
 
                                                 
34 See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 248-49. One aspect of chaos theory is 
deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the system, the more 
likely it is that failures will occur. Thus, the most successful (complex) systems are those in which the 
consequences of failures are limited. In engineering design, for example, this can be done by decoupling 
systems through modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will 
systemically trigger a failure in another part.  
35 Id. 
36 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1349 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025. 
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 The 2008 financial crisis, for example, almost certainly was caused, or 
at least made worse, by the two correlations working in combination. 
Subprime mortgage loans were bundled together as collateral to partially 
support the payment of complex mortgage-backed securities that were sold 
to banks and other financial firms worldwide.37 When home prices began 
falling, some of these mortgage-backed securities began defaulting, 
requiring financial firms heavily invested in these securities to write down 
their value, causing these firms to appear, if not be, more financially risky.38 
This represented a failure of these firms to see, or at least to fully appreciate, 
the intra-firm correlation between low-probability risk—in this case, the risk 
that home prices would significantly fall—and firm integrity.39 
 
 The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide 
correlations—not only the tight interconnectedness among banks and non-
bank financial firms but also the tight interconnectedness between financial 
                                                 
37 To some extent, the U.S. government itself pressured banks and other mortgage lenders to make and 
securitize subprime mortgage loans, in order to expand homeownership. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON, THE 
LOST CAUSE: THE FAILURE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011), 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf. Misguided government policy can certainly contribute to 
systemic risk. See, e.g., e-mail from Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, 
Columbia University Graduate School of Business, to the author (Oct. 13, 2011) (observing that 
“[g]overnment policy is the main contributor to systemic risk, not just in the recent crisis, but more 
generally”).   
38 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
39 The problem of assessing the risk of low-probability adverse events is especially acute during periods in 
which there have been no major adverse economic shocks. Recent stability then allays fears of adverse 
occurrences, and market participants begin to view the recent event-data as following a normal distribution, 
in which observations that deviate dramatically from the mean lie in the distribution’s thin tails. In reality, 
however, longer-term data may reveal a distribution of outcomes with higher kurtosis, or “fat tails,” so that 
the true risk of extreme events is far greater than it is under a normal distribution. Market participants may 
also underestimate mundane low-probability events. Unusual events, such as a large meteor hitting the 
earth, are highly salient, whereas more mundane events, such as changes in collateral value, are 
commonplace, possibly existing on a continuum. The very familiarity with collateral of individuals 
working in the financial sector might have led them to underestimate the potential consequences of a drop 
in collateral prices. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36. 
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firms and markets.40 What made the financial crisis so devastating was that 
these failures combined to facilitate the transmission of economic shocks. 
 
 Regulation should try to increase awareness of these types of 
correlations and limit their potential to combine. Prof. Anabtawi and I have 
shown, however, that the same types of market failures that impair 
efficiency—which I have just demonstrated cannot be completely prevented 
by regulation41—make it unlikely that financial market participants will use 
sufficient effort to either identify the correlations or attempt to prevent their 
combining.42 Furthermore, we have identified only one of potentially many 
transmission mechanisms for systemic failure.43 Regulators therefore need to 
turn to ways to stabilize the financial system that go beyond limiting the 
transmission of systemic shocks.   
 
C. Stabilizing the Afflicted Financial System 
Regulation could also work ex post even after a systemic shock has 
been triggered and is being transmitted. The regulation would then attempt 
to stabilize the afflicted financial system. This could be done by trying to 
stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets impacted by the 
                                                 
40 The tight interconnectedness described above also can have a temporal component insofar as the 
connections, being interactive, work too quickly to control. See supra note 7. 
41 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
42 Information and incentive failure, for example, can cause failures to identify or fully appreciate both 
correlations: between low-probability risk and firm integrity, and among financial firms and markets. 
Rationality failure can also foster failures to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between low-
probability risk and firm integrity. And principal-agent failure can result in a failure to identify or fully 
appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk and firm integrity. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, 
supra note 36. 
43 Cf. supra note 37 (noting that misguided government policy can contribute to systemic risk). Being 
driven by short-term political decisions and other non-economic factors, government policy will always be 
a risk factor.  
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transmission.44 This approach again takes inspiration from chaos theory, 
insofar as that theory holds that remedies should also focus on limiting the 
consequences of failures.45 
 
There are at least two ways that regulation could stabilize systemically 
important firms and financial markets: by ensuring liquidity to those firms 
and markets, and by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally 
robust.  
 
1. Ensuring Liquidity to Firms and Markets.  Liquidity has 
traditionally been used, especially by government central banks, to help 
prevent financial firms from defaulting. The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, for 
example, has had this role of lender of last resort to banks.46 And the 
European Commission is in the process of attempting to help recapitalize 
European banks that are exposed to sovereign-debt risk.  
 
Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms would 
follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be 
partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund. 
Privatizing the source of liquidity would help to address the public costs of a 
lender of last resort: the shifting to taxpayers of the costs of loans that are 
not repaid, and the fostering of moral hazard that could result by 
encouraging financial firms—especially those that believe they are “too big 
to fail”—to be fiscally reckless. Also, internalizing costs by privatizing the 
                                                 
44 To the extent regulation stabilizes a systemically important firm that otherwise would be failing due to 
endogenous or non-systemic exogenous causes, the regulation could also be viewed as an ex ante solution. 
45 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
46 Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2010). 
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source of liquidity would help to address the dilemma that market 
participants, even those that are not (and that know they are not) too big to 
fail, are economically motivated to create externalities that could have 
systemic consequences.47   
 
Perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act undercuts liquidity by sharply 
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to 
individual or insolvent financial firms.48 That categorical limitation appears 
somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort can be an 
important safeguard if it acts judiciously. Even more perversely, the idea of 
a systemic risk fund was originally included in the bill that would become 
the Dodd-Frank Act but was taken out before enactment because of 
opposition by politicians who believed that the fund would increase moral 
hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.49 I believe that belief is misguided. The 
likelihood that systemically important firms will have to make additional 
contributions to the fund to replenish bailout monies should motivate those 
firms to monitor each other and help control each other’s risky behavior.  
 
The European Commission apparently has been considering the idea 
of a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial 
sector.50 Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently 
                                                 
47 Cf. supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.  
48 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101. 
49 S. Amdt. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a tax 
on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies). 
50 European Commission, Taxation of the Financial Sector, a Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: (Brussels COM (2010) 549/5; SEC (2010) 1166). See also European Draft Directive on a 
Common System of Financial Tax (Sept. 28, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm. 
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unresolved,51 news reports indicate that an originally contemplated use was 
a systemic risk fund.52 The IMF also appears to be using the European 
Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes on 
banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial 
meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.”53  
 
I’ve so far discussed ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically 
important firms. But recall that financial markets too can be triggers and 
transmitters of systemic risk. Liquidity can also be used to stabilize 
systemically important financial markets.54 For example, in response to the 
post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve 
created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a lender 
of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary 
liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated 
issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper.55 The CPFF apparently 
helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.56 
 
                                                 
51 Id. (indicating that one of the possible uses of the tax would be to provide a source of funds for the EU).  
52 Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down Banks that Go Bust (May 26, 
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/news/economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
53 Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2010, 
at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by the IMF’s then-Managing Director Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn). 
54 This was first proposed in Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 225-30. 
55 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 423 (April 1, 2010). 
56 Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial paper market”). 
This is very different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank purchases securities as a form of 
monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been engaged in quantitative easing programs, 
purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term interest rates. In contrast, I 
contemplate the task of a market liquidity provider of last resort as much more targeted: to prevent market 
collapses due to panic.  
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This same approach can be applied more broadly to respond to panic 
in securities market.57 Say, for example, that the intrinsic value—effectively 
the present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a 
type of mortgage-backed security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents 
on the dollar. If the market price of those securities had fallen significantly 
below that number, say, to 20 cents on the dollar, the market liquidity 
provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the dollar, 
thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder 
of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity 
provider could, for example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price” 
if the securities turn out to be worth more than expected.58 This is just one 
(simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in structured 
financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value which could 
be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s purchases.59    
 
2. Requiring Firms and Markets to be More Internally Robust.  
 Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms 
                                                 
57 One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a deep discount to stabilize 
markets and still make money, private investors would not also do so, thereby eliminating the need for 
some sort of governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will 
not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other 
investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and sell 
securities, without having to wait for their maturities; whereas a market liquidity provider of last resort 
should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary. 
58 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., Edward Elgar 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563 (using this example). 
59 Alternatively, a market liquidity provider of last resort could attempt to stabilize the market by entering 
into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in effect, the 
market’s irrationality element—thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging—and not actually 
purchasing securities directly—the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less investment 
risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable. Id. 
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and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust.60 This could be 
accomplished in various ways. First consider firms. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires banks and, to the extent 
designated as “systemically important,” other financial firms to be subject to 
a range of capital and similar requirements.61 Addressing the possibility that 
a firm could nevertheless end up failing, the Act also requires these firms to 
submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living will”—that sets forth how the 
firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to minimize further systemic 
impact.62  
 
The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and their 
potential impact on efficiency, are open questions. Reducing a firm’s 
leverage, for example, can certainly enable the firm to withstand economic 
shocks and reduce its chance of failure.63 The Basel capital requirements, 
however, did not prevent the many bank failures resulting from the 2008 
financial crisis. Setting regulatory limits on leverage could also backfire 
because some leverage is good but there is no optimal across-the-board 
amount of leverage that is right for every firm. Regulation should at least 
focus, however, on attempting to prevent firms from opportunistically 
overleveraging themselves during boom times, thereby correcting that type 
of cyclical imbalance.  
                                                 
60 Although I refer to regulation requiring firms to become more internally robust as ex post (in the sense 
that more robust firms can better withstand a systemic shock), such regulation could also be viewed as ex 
ante in the sense that robust firms are less likely to fail and thereby trigger a systemic shock. I am still 
pondering the appropriate ex-ante/ex-post distinction.   
61 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 115(b) & 165(i). The Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve, for example, to 
set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial firms, including a maximum debt-to-equity 
ratio of 15:1. Id. § 165(j). 
62 Id. § 165(d). 
63 Cf. text following note 4, supra (discussing highly leveraged firms engaging in fire-sales of assets). 
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One also might question Dodd-Frank’s living-will requirement. Ex 
ante plans (such as a liquidation plan made when a financial firm is healthy) 
rarely match ex post realities (such as the realities facing the firm when 
financially challenged). Moreover, it is uncertain whether future politicians 
would, or should, force the liquidation of a large financial firm, even 
pursuant to its living will, without considering the consequences at that time.  
 
The Dodd-Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a 
systemically important firm’s right to make risky investments—often 
referred to as the Volcker Rule.64 This is a highly paternalistic approach, 
substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s own business 
judgment. I’m generally skeptical of any rule that attempts to protect a 
sophisticated financial firm from itself65—and indeed, Moody’s has warned 
that a leaked early draft of interagency rules implementing the Volcker Rule 
would, if adopted, probably “diminish the flexibility and profitability of 
banks’ valuable market-making operations and place them at a competitive 
disadvantage to firms not constrained by the rule.”66  
 
Dodd-Frank appropriately does require many large public firms to 
institute internal governance procedures to protect the firm, including 
                                                 
64 See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13 (codifying steps to implement the Volcker Rule limiting proprietary 
trading). Several federal agencies—the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—recently proposed rules to implement this.   
65 I recognize that even sophisticated financial firms sometimes might not fully understand a highly 
complex investment. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing misinformation). The ultimate 
question of the value of the Volcker Rule will therefore be empirical: whether the benefits of its limitation 
on proprietary trading will outweigh profits lost by losing the ability to engage in such trading. Although 
some may argue that those benefits, which accrue to all, should be more highly weighted than profits, 
which accrue only to the financial firms themselves, my proposal for a privatized systemic risk fund should 
help to internalize any harm of proprietary trading. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying  text.       
66 Edward Wyatt, Regulators to Set Forth Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011 (quoting Moody’s).  
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establishing risk committees (with at least one risk-management expert) 
responsible for enterprise-wide risk management oversight.67 Well managed 
firms should—and in my experience already do—have these types of 
procedures and committees. 
 
Also, appropriately in my judgment, the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
attempt to artificially limit the size of financial firms. Some have argued that 
size limits would minimize the potential moral hazard from firms that 
believe they are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence of 
such risky behavior, and financial firm losses can be explained by other 
reasons. Size should be governed by the economies of scale and scope 
needed for firms to successfully compete, domestically and abroad—so long 
as that size is manageable.  
 
We should be cautious, however, of financial firms that increase their 
size, especially by acquisition of other firms, primarily to satisfy senior 
management egos. Dodd-Frank indirectly addresses this concern (at least 
weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to long-term results—for 
example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt standards whereby listed 
companies implement policies to recoup senior executive compensation in 
the event of an accounting restatement.68  
 
Another way that regulation could make systemically important firms 
more internally robust is by requiring at least some portion of their debt to 
                                                 
67 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h). 
68 Id. § 954. 
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be in the form of so-called contingent capital.69 Contingent capital debt 
would automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of pre-agreed 
events. Requiring contingent capital is therefore effectively like requiring a 
pre-planned debt restructuring or workout.  
 
It’s unclear if regulatory-imposed contingent capital would be 
efficient. If contingent capital is a good idea, markets themselves should 
implement it; I don’t see any market failures impeding that implementation. 
I’m also skeptical whether regulatory-imposed contingent capital might have 
unforeseen consequences. For example, might automatic conversions of debt 
claims to equity interests create counterparty risk by reducing the value of 
firms holding those claims?70 
 
Finally, regulation could focus on making systemically important 
firms more internally robust at least to the extent such firms provide public 
goods. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act (which has 
since been revoked) had created a separation between commercial and 
investment banking—the former including deposit taking and lending, the 
latter including securities underwriting and investing. Although the Dodd-
Frank Act does not reinstitute this separation, the final report of the U.K. 
Independent Commission on Banking (often called the Vickers Report71) 
recommends a more limited form of separation, which it calls ring-fencing, 
intended to protect the “basic banking services of safeguarding retail 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 795 (2011). 
70 The conversion would constitute an actual reduction in value if the pre-agreed trigger is sensible.  
71 Although I provided input for this Report in a November 12, 2010 meeting at All Souls College, 
University of Oxford, with Commission Chairman Sir John Vickers and other members of the 
Commission’s Secretariat, I did not suggest the ring-fencing procedure that the Report eventually adopted.  
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deposits, operating secure payments systems, efficiently channelling savings 
to productive investments [i.e., making loans], and managing financial 
risk.”72 The ring-fencing proposed in the Vickers Report appears to have 
similarities to ring-fencing used in the United States to protect essential 
public utilities, which often operate as subsidiaries within holding-company 
structures.73   
 
Ring-fencing is more of a micro- than macro-prudential approach 
since its focus is more on protecting retail banking activities rather than on 
preventing systemic collapse.74 Nonetheless, to the extent it improves 
consumer confidence, ring-fencing of retail banking might help to improve 
the real economy.  
 
I have discussed how regulation could help to stabilize firms. 
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important markets. This 
                                                 
72 Vickers Report, at 7. 
73 In expert testimony to a state public service commission, I have recently defined utility ring-fencing as 
follows: “The term ring-fencing is not always clearly defined. By ‘ring-fencing,’ I mean protection of [the 
utility subsidiary] and its assets from harm caused by the [utility subsidiary’s] affiliates. A primary goal of 
ring-fencing is protecting the [utility subsidiary] from harm caused by a possible bankruptcy of one or more 
of its affiliates. This is achieved by making it unlikely that an affiliate’s bankruptcy will involuntarily force 
the [utility subsidiary] into bankruptcy or cause a substantive consolidation of the affiliate and the [utility 
subsidiary] or cause the [utility subsidiary] to voluntarily file for bankruptcy. Another goal of ring-fencing 
is protecting the [utility subsidiary’s] assets from being raided by an affiliate. This can be achieved by 
imposing dividend restrictions on the [utility subsidiary] and by restricting non-arm’s length transactions 
that are unfair to the [utility subsidiary].” The Vickers Report similarly proposes that the “banks’ UK retail 
activities [] be carried out in separate subsidiaries. The UK retail subsidiaries would be legally, 
economically and operationally separate from the rest of the banking groups to which they belonged.” 
Vickers Report at 11.    
74 Cf. Laurence Kotlikoff, Why the Vickers Report Failed the UK and the World, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011 
(observing, among other things, that the flaw of “ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their 
thing” is demonstrated by “the collapse of Lehman Brothers [which Prof. Kotlikoff likens to a bad bank], 
whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system”).  
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could occur, for example, by requiring appropriate circuit breakers, a topic 
which I do not (unfortunately) have the time to discuss.75   
 
 D. Summary 
 Regulation could protect the financial system in at least three ways: 
by limiting the triggers of systemic risk, by limiting the transmission of 
systemic shocks, and by attempting to stabilize the system. Eliminating the 
triggers of systemic risk is not feasible. Eliminating the transmission of 
systemic shocks is likewise not feasible.   
 
 It therefore is critical to try to stabilize the financial system against the 
consequences of systemic shocks. This will involve stabilizing both 
systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the shocks. I 
have examined two approaches to stabilization: ensuring liquidity to those 
firms and markets, and requiring those firms and markets to be more 
internally robust.  
 
 I am reasonably comfortable with the first approach (ensuring 
liquidity), especially if the source of the liquidity could be privatized. That 
not only would stabilize firms and markets but also would help to control the 
motivation of systemically important firms to externalize their costs (and 
thus reduce public costs). The extent to which regulation can efficiently 
require systemically important firms and markets to be more internally 
robust is a more open question.   
 
                                                 
75 For a discussion of market circuit breakers, see, e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 1398-
1401.  
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 IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 I have attempted to build an analytical framework for regulating 
systemic risk. Any such framework, however, will be imperfect and have 
tradeoffs. Complexity and complacency, among other factors, make ex-ante 
preventive regulation insufficient. Regulation therefore must operate ex post 
as well, by attempting to limit the transmission of systemic risk and reduce 
systemic consequences.  
 
 For example, regulation to limit principal-agent failures by paying 
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation 
schemes would operate ex ante, or preventively. To avoid prejudicing the 
competitiveness of firms in any given nation (or, as in the EU, any region), 
this type of regulation ideally should be global.  
 
 Regulation to provide liquidity to systemically important firms and 
markets would operate more ex post, by helping to stabilize the financial 
system. The source of this liquidity could—and arguably should—be 
privatized by requiring firms to contribute to a systemic risk fund. That type 
of requirement should (again) ideally be global to avoid prejudicing the 
competitiveness of any nation or region—a fact that the European 
Commission has recognized in connection with its similar proposal to 
impose a tax on the financial sector.76  
 
 Thank you. 
                                                 
76 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.  
